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INTRODUCTION
Members of the United States Supreme Court frequently cite Rust v.
Sullivan1 when analyzing issues implicating government speech or funding.
Yet, there is sharp disagreement about how to characterize that case, and
the competing versions have very different implications. While the Court
could offer an authoritative construction of Rust that would reduce if not
eliminate the number of inconsistent Rust analyses, the justification for rejecting some of the competing versions might well provide the basis for undermining several cases that have used Rust as a foundation. The Court’s
practice of citing Rust for very different constitutional approaches not only
makes Rust difficult to understand, but also destabilizes the jurisprudential
lines based on Rust. A brief examination of the contradictory accounts of

*
1

Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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Rust illustrates how the willingness of members of the Court to recharacterize cases to reach a preferred result can undermine constitutional guarantees and the rule of law.
Part I of this Article discusses Rust, explaining both what the Court held
and why it is subject to differing interpretations. Part II discusses the oscillating characterizations of Rust, and how the Court has undermined various
parts of First Amendment jurisprudence by its frequent Rust recharacterizations that conveniently provide the basis for a desired result. The Article concludes that unless the Court offers more consistent and plausible analyses of
the various jurisprudential lines that Rust is used to support, both those lines
and the Court’s remaining credibility may be undermined beyond repair.
I. RUST V. SULLIVAN
Rust v. Sullivan was controversial for a number of reasons, not least of
which was that it prohibited physicians who had received certain funds
from discussing abortion with their patients.2 The Court provided several
rationales for upholding the prohibition without making clear which of the
rationales provided the basis for the opinion. That failure made the opinion even more difficult to understand and more open to criticism than it
might otherwise have been.
Rust involved the constitutionality of a federal program designed to fund
family planning services.3 Because family planning can involve a whole
range of services, the program’s intended scope needed clarification. Congress had specified that funds could not be used to support abortion as a
method of family planning,4 but that still left open how the particular limitation was to be interpreted. The Court explained that Congress “intended
to ensure that Title X funds would ‘be used only to support preventive family planning services, population research, infertility services, and other related medical, informational, and educational activities.’”5 By limiting the
use of the funds in this way, Congress made clear that the focus of Title X
funding was for services prior to conception.
In 1988, the Secretary of Health and Human Services explained that
“Title X services are limited to ‘preconceptional counseling, education, and
general reproductive health care,’ and expressly exclude ‘pregnancy care
2

3
4
5

Id. at 180 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1989)). The Court, however, claimed that the regulation
did not constitute a complete prohibition. See id. at 196 (“The Secretary’s regulations do not
force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee
keep such activities separate and distinct from Title X activities.”).
Id. at 178 (“Title X of the Public Health Service Act (Act), 84 Stat. 1506, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300 to 300a-6, . . . provides federal funding for family-planning services.”).
Id. (noting that “[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988)).
Id. at 178–79 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 91-1667, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.)).
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(including obstetric or prenatal care).’”6 Women seeking aid in determining
the best ways to time their future pregnancies could be helped. However,
currently “pregnant women must be referred to appropriate prenatal care
services.”7 Thus, the program’s provision of assistance in family planning
was limited in that only pre-pregnancy services could be provided.
A pregnant woman seeking advice from a physician employed at a Title-X-funded facility could not receive counseling, because “the program
does not furnish services related to childbirth.”8 Rather, such a patient
would receive “transitional information,”9 i.e., a referral “for appropriate
prenatal and/or social services” by way of “a list of available providers that
promote the welfare of mother and unborn child.”10 However, “appropriate” was defined in a particular way in that those making a referral were
prohibited from directly or indirectly promoting abortion. Not only was an
employee of a “Title X project . . . expressly prohibited from referring a
pregnant woman to an abortion provider,”11 but any referral list could not
indirectly encourage abortion.12
Suppose that a patient expressly asked to be referred to an abortion
provider. Although prohibited from making such a referral,13 the physician
was not required to remain silent. “One permissible response to such an
inquiry is that ‘the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion.’”14 The physician had other alternatives as well, such as providing a
list of health care providers including one or more who provided abortion
among other services.15 However, the referring physician was precluded
from “weighing the list of referrals in favor of health care providers which
perform abortions”16 and was also precluded from “excluding available
providers who do not provide abortions.”17 Finally, the referring physician
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16

17

Id. at 179 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1989)).
Id. (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2925 (Feb. 2, 1988)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1989)).
Id. at 180.
See id. (citing § 59.8(a)(3)) (explaining that a Title X project was expressly prohibited from indirectly encouraging abortion through referrals).
Id. (“The Title X project is expressly prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion
provider, even upon specific request.”).
Id. (quoting § 59.8(b)(5)).
Ann Brewster Weeks, The Pregnant Silence: Rust v. Sullivan, Abortion Rights, and Publicly Funded Speech,
70 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1632–33 n.45 (1992) (“Referral lists were required to be weighted towards
providers of prenatal care, but could include facilities providing abortion-related services . . . .”
(citing New York v. Sulivan, 889 F.2d 401, 410–14 (2d Cir. 1989), aff’d sub nom. Rust, 500 U.S. 173).
Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (quoting § 59.8(a)(3)); see also Thomas Wm. Mayo, Abortion and Speech: A
Comment, 46 SMU L. REV. 309, 309 (1992) (“[A] pregnant patient could not be given a referral
list that is weighted in favor of health care providers who offer abortions.”).
Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (quoting § 59.8(a)(3)).
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was prohibited from “‘steering’ clients to providers who offer abortion as a
method of family planning.”18 The patient would have to figure out for
herself which, if any, of those on the referral list would provide the abortion
services she sought.19
The Rust policy has been described as a gag rule, because physicians
were prohibited from discussing abortion.20 While the Rust policy did not
preclude patients from eventually securing an abortion, it decreased the
likelihood that a patient would secure one. Because the refusal list could
not be weighted in favor of abortion providers and could not exclude providers merely because of their refusal to provide abortions, the policy in effect placed additional obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion,
even if those obstacles were not always insurmountable, given sufficient
knowledge, tenacity, and means.21
The Court quickly dispensed with the challenge that the regulation unconstitutionally burdened a woman’s right to choose an abortion. “Congress’
refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman
with the same choices as if the Government had chosen not to fund familyplanning services at all.”22 While the Court was correct that many women
would be no worse off as a result of the Rust policy than they would have
been if Congress had refrained from funding family planning services as a
general matter, it was unclear whether the Court was thereby announcing
the relevant standard for the constitutionality of congressional funding. If so,
the Court was announcing a very deferential standard.23 But as Justice
Blackmun noted in his dissent, government does not have carte blanche to
fund whatever it wants as long as those not benefiting from the largesse
would be no worse off than they would have been if Congress had simply
withheld the funds as a general matter. “[T]here are some bases upon which
18
19

20

21

22

23

Id. (quoting § 59.8(a)(3)).
See infra notes 22–23 and accompanying text (noting that the Court in Rust was correct in finding
that women would be no worse off as a result of this policy than they would have been had there
been no funding at all).
See Weeks, supra note 15, at 1624 (“In Rust the Court declared constitutional a set of controversial
federal regulations known colloquially as the Gag Rules, which forbid health care providers at
publicly funded family planning clinics from speaking with their patients about abortion.” (footnote omitted)).
See Linda Maher, Government Funding in Title X Projects: Circumscribing the Constitutional Rights of the
Indigent: Rust v. Sullivan, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 143, 171 (1992) (“It may also leave her without adequate time in which to safely seek an abortion, if she is confused by the restrictions or the limited
medical advice.”).
Rust, 500 U.S. at 202; see also Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and Compulsory Maternity, 2010
U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 764 (“[T]he Court engaged in an unspoken ‘greater includes the lesser’
analysis and described that this choice in funding is not the same as a penalty and leaves women
in same position as if the federal funding did not exist at all.”).
Cf. Mark P. McKenna, Intellectual Property, Privatization and Democracy: A Response to Professor Rose, 50
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 829, 837 (2006) (“As Justice Scalia noted in a recent speech about government
funding of the arts, it has long been the case that ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune.’”).
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government may not rest its decision to fund or not to fund. For example,
the Members of the majority surely would agree that government may not
base its decision to support an activity upon considerations of race.”24
The petitioners had argued that the funding restriction placed undue
limits on the doctor-patient relationship.25 But the Rust restriction was distinguishable from others requiring “all doctors within their respective jurisdictions to provide all pregnant patients contemplating an abortion a litany
of information, regardless of whether the patient sought the information or
whether the doctor thought the information necessary to the patient’s decision.”26 The Court noted that doctors not receiving Title X funding were
free to discuss abortion.27 While women might well have been better off if
they were able to receive abortion counseling at a Title X funded facility,
the “Constitution does not require that the Government distort the scope of
its mandated program in order to provide that information.”28 Thus, the
Court reasoned, while states cannot require all physicians to provide certain
information to any woman contemplating an abortion, Congress can limit
the services it funds by refusing to support abortion directly or indirectly.
The Court’s analysis was dissatisfying for a number of reasons. While a
statute requiring all physicians to give their patients irrelevant or contraindicated information is of course objectionable, such a statute would not
be transformed into acceptable legislation merely because it required many
fewer physicians to give their patients irrelevant or contra-indicated information. An individual who has a consultation with her physician reasonably expects to receive medical advice that is given in light of her needs, desires, and condition in particular,29 and this federally imposed limitation
might preclude a patient from hearing about the medically indicated procedure. Perhaps a statute requiring that only a limited number of patients
receive useless or misleading information is less objectionable than a statute
that requires all patients to receive such information,30 but those receiving
24
25

26
27
28
29

30

Rust, 500 U.S. at 210–11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 202 (majority opinion) (“Petitioners also argue that by impermissibly infringing on the doctor-patient relationship and depriving a Title X client of information concerning abortion as a
method of family planning, the regulations violate a woman’s Fifth Amendment right to medical
self-determination and to make informed medical decisions free of government-imposed harm.”).
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id.
Cf. Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government Has
Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1309 (2010) (“Whatever the government needed to do to
ensure that it effectively communicated its family-planning policies to the public, that effort did
not need to include suppressing the speech of healthcare workers who were advising individual
patients about their specific conditions and treatments.”).
Or perhaps not, if the limited dissemination of misleading information has discriminatory effects.
See Risha K. Foulkes, Abstinence-Only Education and Minority Teenagers: The Importance of Race in a Question of Constitutionality, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 13 (2008) (noting that minority
women of color were disproportionately affected by these restrictions).
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this unhelpful information would likely find that their ability to make an informed decision would have been undermined rather than improved.31
While the Court may have been correct that “a doctor’s ability to provide, and a woman’s right to receive, information concerning abortion and
abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X project remains
unfettered,”32 this would be small consolation to those women who were
not even alerted that their condition warranted serious consideration of an
abortion.33 Nor would it be much consolation to those who had wrongly
inferred that they should not seek an abortion based on the advice that they
had received from a Title X funded physician,34 perhaps having relied on
that physician to fulfill her professional responsibility to advance the patient’s medical well-being.35
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted that “Title X grantees may provide counseling and referral regarding any of a wide range of family planning and other topics, save abortion.”36 This limitation was not merely a
content-based restriction—“[t]he regulations are also clearly viewpoint
based.”37 For example, “the regulations command that a project refer for
prenatal care each woman diagnosed as pregnant, irrespective of the woman’s expressed desire to continue or terminate her pregnancy.”38 Further,
“[i]f a client asks directly about abortion, a Title X physician or counselor is
required to say, in essence, that the project does not consider abortion to be
an appropriate method of family planning.”39 But the patient might infer
from such a statement that the physician herself did not believe abortion
appropriate, which might well have been inaccurate.
31

32
33

34

35

36
37
38
39

Cf. Danielle Lang, Truthful but Misleading? The Precarious Balance of Autonomy and State Interests in Casey and Second-Generation Doctor-Patient Regulation, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1353, 1388 (2014) (“[A]t
some critical point, the amount of information that the Nebraska and South Dakota dissuasion
laws would have required would have likely disrupted the patient’s ability to make an autonomous and informed assessment of her options.”).
Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
See id. (“Petitioners contend, however, that most Title X clients are effectively precluded by indigency and poverty from seeing a health-care provider who will provide abortion-related services.”).
Id. at 217 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Title X client will reasonably construe [her physician’s Government-controlled words] as professional advice to forgo her right to obtain an abortion.”).
See id. at 213–14 (“[T]he physicians and counselors who staff Title X projects seek to provide
[their clients] with the full range of information and options regarding their health and reproductive freedom. Indeed, the legitimate expectations of the patient and the ethical responsibilities of
the medical profession demand no less.”); see also Nicole B. Cásarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 557 (2000) (“[T]hese
predominantly lower-income women would hear this state-dictated information from those
whom they were most likely to trust—their doctors and health service providers.”).
Rust, 500 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1990)).
Id. (citing C.F.R. 59.8(b)(4) (1990)).

May 2017]

RUST IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT SCAFFOLDING

867

An individual physician who felt ethically compromised by the limitation40 on what she could say to her patient could simply refuse to be employed at a facility receiving Title X funds.41 But the patient might well be
unaware that the physician who did advise her was prohibited from discussing all of the relevant options.42 When the Court suggested in City of Akron
that “because abortion is a medical procedure, . . . the full vindication of
the woman’s fundamental right necessarily requires that her physician be
given ‘the room he needs to make his best medical judgment,’”43 the Court
was suggesting that physicians as a general matter must be permitted to discuss abortion in appropriate cases and not merely that constitutional requirements are satisfied as long as some physicians are permitted to discuss
it with some of their patients.44
While Rust was clear that the reviewed provision did not violate constitutional guarantees, the Court was less than clear about why that was so. It
could have been because the Court did not believe the restriction particularly burdensome45 or because the restriction was limited to a program that
the government itself was funding.46 But these positions would have differing implications for other kinds of programs whose constitutionality might
be challenged. As to which understanding of Rust would ultimately be
adopted, this would have to be decided at a later date.

40

41

42

43

44

45
46

Cf. id. at 213 (“[T]he physicians and counselors who staff Title X projects seek to provide them
with the full range of information and options regarding their health and reproductive freedom.”).
Id. at 212 (“The Court concludes that the challenged regulations do not violate the First
Amendment rights of Title X staff members because any limitation of the employees’ freedom of
expression is simply a consequence of their decision to accept employment at a federally funded
project.”).
Cf. Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the Demise of Dialogue, 46
RUTGERS L. REV. 1473, 1608–09 n.456 (1994) (discussing “the poor woman who unsuspectingly
walks into the only clinic she can afford and receives slanted government-funded misinformation”).
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983) (quoting Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992). In Casey, the Court overruled Akron insofar as it found “a constitutional violation
when the government requires . . . the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the
nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
JJ.).
The Rust Court did not seem to think so. 500 U.S. at 203 (suggesting that the constitutional
guarantees were not violated as long as physicians not receiving Title X funding remained unconstrained).
See supra notes 27–28, 32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 22, 27–28 and accompanying text.
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II. THE SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT OF RUST
The Rust Court provided one rationale when upholding that restriction,47 but in subsequent decisions the Court recharacterized the Rust
holding and rationale so that it stood for a very different proposition.48 The
difficulty thereby raised was not merely that the understanding of the decision had been reformulated,49 but that the Court has gone back and forth
between differing characterizations to reach particular results and, in at
least some of the cases, a non-preferred interpretation would have led to a
contrary result. The Court’s oscillating characterizations of Rust when
providing the basis for particular holdings underscore that the Court’s approaches to government speech and funding are unprincipled, which makes
them especially unstable.
A. The Court’s Recharacterization of Rust
The Court offered some clarifying remarks about Rust’s foundation in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia.50 Rosenberger involved a
challenge to the refusal of the University of Virginia to fund the printing
costs of a student publication that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”51 Citing Rust, the
University had argued that “content-based funding decisions are both inevitable and lawful.”52 However, the Rosenberger Court distinguished Rust.53
While admitting that the Rust Court had “upheld the government’s prohibition on abortion-related advice applicable to recipients of federal funds for
family planning counseling,” the Rosenberger Court characterized the Rust
program in the following way: “[T]he government did not create a program to encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to

47

48

49

50
51
52
53

Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (“The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund
a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the
same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way.”).
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[In Rust],
the government did not create a program to encourage private speech but instead used private
speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program . . . . [W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say
what it wishes.”).
Cf. Nadine Strossen, United States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-Based
Speech Restrictions, 2009-2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 104 (2010) (“[T]the Supreme Court took
the opportunity to reformulate the key passage in Chaplinsky and to recharacterize Ferber in ways
that should strictly limit both decisions’ precedential force for further content-based restrictions.”).
See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Id. at 823 (alteration in original).
Id. at 833.
Id.
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transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.”54 The Rosenberger Court then explained that “when the government appropriates public
funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes” and, further, that “[w]hen the government disburses public funds
to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate
and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”55 Thus, while the Rust Court had implied that the
government was permitted to restrict its funding to messages of which it
approved,56 the Rosenberger Court implied that the Rust restriction was permissible because the government, itself, was speaking.
Once Rust was cabined, the Rosenberger Court explained that a different
analysis is appropriate when the state “does not itself speak or subsidize
transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers.”57 When the state provides a forum for private speakers, it “may not silence the expression of selected
viewpoints.”58 The Court’s characterizations of Rust as a government
speech case and Rosenberger as a private speech case had important implications for the resolution of Rosenberger.
Suppose that the Rust holding was that the government as funder was
permitted to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint because, in effect, the
government had decided that it was only willing to pay for speech that favored childbirth and was simply unwilling to fund pro-abortion speech.
Were that the correct reading of Rust, then the University of Virginia would
have been correct that Rust establishes the permissibility of a state deciding
to discriminate among viewpoints by funding certain views and not others.59
The University of Virginia had argued that it was engaging in content rather than viewpoint discrimination, because it was unwilling to fund any approach expressing a view about the existence of a deity or ultimate reality—
theists, agnostics, and atheists would all be denied funding.60 Thus, all

54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id.
Id.
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–94 (1991).
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
Id. at 835.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“And since [the regulation] limits funding
to activities promoting or manifesting a particular belief not only ‘in’ but ‘about’ a deity or ultimate reality, it applies to agnostics and atheists as well as it does to deists and theists . . . .”); see also Jennifer Lynn Davis, Note, The Serpentine Wall of Separation Between Church and State: Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1225, 1253 (1996) (“One significant aspect of the Rosenberger opinion, then, is that the Court concluded that a prohibition on
all forms of religious speech is viewpoint discrimination and not content discrimination.”).
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viewpoints on a particular topic would not be funded.61 The Rosenberger
Court rejected that the University was engaging in content rather than
viewpoint discrimination,62 although the basis for that rejection was not entirely clear. While the dissent had argued that “no viewpoint discrimination occurs because the Guidelines discriminate against an entire class of
viewpoints,” the Court explained that the dissent’s view “reflects an insupportable assumption that all debate is bipolar and that antireligious speech
is the only response to religious speech.”63 But the dissent had not offered a
bipolar view, instead having suggested that any of a range of views about
the existence of a deity or ultimate reality would not receive funding.64
The Court seemed to understand that the dissent was suggesting that
more than two views were excluded, but then argued that the “dissent’s
declaration that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are silenced
is simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways.”65 While the
Court’s point would be well-taken were there several views on a particular
subject and half of them were barred,66 the criticism is not persuasive when
all of the voices on a particular topic are muted.67
The Rosenberger Court was likely worried that viewpoint discrimination
might be masked as content discrimination,68 an eventuality that the Court
may itself have made more likely by suggesting that the difference between
content and viewpoint discrimination is a matter of degree.69 Claiming that
this was a matter of degree was especially unfortunate in the context under
discussion because content discrimination is sometimes permissible in the
context of a limited purpose public forum.70 “The necessities of confining a
forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may
justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”71 Thus, if the state-created limitations on a forum are reasona61

62
63
64
65
66

67
68
69
70
71

See Mark Strasser, Leaving the Dale to Be More Fair: On CLS v. Martinez and First Amendment Jurisprudence, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 235, 246 (2012) (“[T]the policy applied to all discussions of a
particular kind of content, regardless of viewpoint.”).
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“We conclude . . . that here . . . viewpoint discrimination is the proper way to interpret the University’s objections to Wide Awake.”).
Id.
See id. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing limiting funding to other groups of deists, atheists,
and agnostics).
Id. at 831–32 (majority opinion).
Strasser, supra note 61, at 247 (“The Court’s construing the silencing of multiple voices as viewpoint discrimination would be understandable if, for example, four views on a particular topic
had been excluded while two or three other views on that same topic had been permitted.”).
Id. (“But the University had precluded providing financial support for any view on particular topics, and thus had simply limited the forum by excluding certain contents.” (footnote omitted)).
Cf. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“[I]t must be acknowledged, the distinction is not a precise one.”).
See id. at 829 (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”).
See id. at 830 (“[C]ontent discrimination . . . may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that
limited forum . . . .”).
Id.
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ble in light of the state’s legitimate purpose, those limitations will be upheld.72
That said, however, “viewpoint discrimination . . . is presumed impermissible
when directed against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”73
The Rosenberger Court had to overcome at least two obstacles if it was going to strike down the University’s refusal to fund the publication costs at
issue. First, assuming that the University had set up a limited purpose public forum,74 the Court would either have to treat the restriction as viewpoint-based or as content-based. If the former, then the restriction likely
could not pass muster.75 If the latter, then the restriction would be unconstitutional only if not reasonable in light of the University’s purpose, a much
easier standard for the University to meet.76
After finding that the University’s restriction was viewpoint-based,77 the
Court had no difficulty in plausibly suggesting that the University could not
meet its burden when defending the constitutionality of its practice.78 But
the Court’s approach to finding viewpoint rather than content discrimination creates potential difficulties in other cases involving limited public fora.
If the removal of all rather than some viewpoints on a particular topic
nonetheless counts as viewpoint discrimination,79 then limited public fora
(when defined in terms of permissible contents80) would seem readily susceptible to attack by construing them as discriminating on the basis of
viewpoint rather than content.81 The Court did nothing to reduce that
vulnerability, e.g., by offering a helpful guide for determining when claimed
content discrimination was in fact viewpoint discrimination. Instead, the
Court simply “acknowledged [that] the distinction is not a precise one,”
and “conclude[d] . . . that . . . viewpoint discrimination is the proper way to

72
73
74

75
76
77
78

79

80

81

See id.
Id. at 830 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
at 837) (“We held [in Rosenberger] that by subsidizing the Student Activities Fund, the University
had created a limited public forum, from which it impermissibly excluded all publications with
religious editorial viewpoints.”).
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
See id. at 832 (“The University’s denial of WAP’s request for third-party payments in the present
case is based upon viewpoint discrimination not unlike the discrimination the school district relied upon in Lamb’s Chapel and that we found invalid.”).
Strasser, supra note 61, at 247 (“The difficulty with the Rosenberger analysis was that it suggested
that removing all viewpoints on a particular topic was nonetheless viewpoint rather than content
discrimination.”).
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009) (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–107 (2001)) (“In such a [limited purpose] forum, a government
entity may impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”).
Strasser, supra note 61, at 247 (“Such an analysis suggests that a limitation on content will simply
be interpreted as a limitation of multiple viewpoints and will then be subject to the kind of scrutiny reserved for viewpoint discrimination.”).
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interpret the University’s objections to Wide Awake.”82 The Court did not
even point to the facts or practices establishing that the University was engaging in viewpoint discrimination, and instead seemed to be adopting a
“we know it when we see it” approach to viewpoint discrimination.83
Suppose that the Court could offer a persuasive account of why Rosenberger involved viewpoint rather than content discrimination.84 Even so, the
Rosenberger Court had to overcome a second obstacle, namely, that Rust
seemed to establish that the government could fund some viewpoints without funding others.85
The Rosenberger analysis of why Rust was distinguishable because involving government speech86 was not particularly plausible—the doctors did
not view themselves as spokespersons for the government;87 the patients did
not view their doctors that way either;88 and the Rust Court itself did not
seem to view the case as one involving government speech.89 Further, the
Rust recharacterization has important implications for state beliefs regarding the appropriate practice of medicine. In effect, the Rosenberger account
of Rust implies that the state recommends certain medical approaches (and
not others) without considering the particular needs of the patient.90 To

82
83

84
85

86
87

88
89
90

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it . . . .”).
Cf. Cásarez, supra note 35, at 529 (arguing that the University of Virginia’s “regulation appears to
carry a significant risk of viewpoint discrimination”).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“[T]he Government has not discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”); id. at
194 (“When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other
countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund a program
to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” (citing 22
U.S.C. § 4411(b) (1988)); Alan Trammell, The Cabining of Rosenberger: Locke v. Davey and the
Broad Nondiscrimination Principle That Never Was, 92 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1999 (2006) (“If Rust stood
for the proposition that the government had wide discretion in its funding decisions, the University had arguably acted within the zone of its discretion.”).
See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
Arthur N. Eisenberg, The Brooklyn Museum Controversy and the Issue of Government-Funded Expression, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 275, 306 (2000) (“In fact, such physicians did not regard themselves merely as
spokespersons for the government nor can it be plausibly claimed that their patients regarded
them simply as government messengers.”).
Id.
Trammell, supra note 85, at 1999 (“Judging by the language of Rust, there is no reason to think
that it has anything to do with the government speech or public forum cases.”).
As I’ve explained elsewhere, such a recommendation is not credible. See Mark Strasser, Ignore the
Man Behind the Curtain: On the Government Speech Doctrine and What It Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
85, 92 (2011) (“Yet, it is not credible for the government to tell a particular patient (without
knowing anything at all about that patient) that it would be best for her not to have an abortion.”); cf. Gey, supra note 29, at 1309 (“Whatever the government needed to do to ensure that it
effectively communicated its family-planning policies to the public, that effort did not need to in-

May 2017]

RUST IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT SCAFFOLDING

873

make matters worse, the government was making a recommendation that
might have been antithetical to the patient’s needs without informing her
that the government never believes abortion a viable option—only if she
asked about abortion might she be told that the project did not consider
abortion appropriate.91 If she did not ask, then she might well make unwarranted assumptions about whether an abortion would have been appropriate in her case.92
The Rosenberger Court reached its desired result by clarifying certain
matters and obscuring others. Forum doctrine became more confused, e.g.,
because it became less clear how to tell whether a limited purpose public
forum involved content rather than viewpoint discrimination.93 In contrast,
the Court offered a clarification of Rust by explaining that the case involved
government speech,94 although that characterization was not particularly
plausible.95
After Rosenberger, the Court’s policy seemed clear. When the government
is speaking (even through private individuals), the government is permitted
to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. However, when the government is
not itself speaking but instead has set up a forum for private speech, discrimination on the basis of viewpoint is not permissible.96 Yet, this approach was
brought into question97 in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.98

91
92

93

94

95
96

97

98

clude suppressing the speech of healthcare workers who were advising individual patients about
their specific conditions and treatments.”).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 209 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(4)
(1990)).
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 605, 670 (2008) (“[C]onfusion about whether the doctor’s communication represents government policy (as claimed in Rust) or expert advice may lead the patient to believe that her doctor ruled out abortion as a medically viable option for her in particular.”).
See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. Or, the Court might have been making a different
claim sub silentio. See Strasser, supra note 61, at 249 (“The Court might implicitly have been challenging the reasonableness of limiting a university forum in such a way that discussions promoting or opposing religious points of view are excluded.”).
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“When the government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the
grantee.” (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196–200)).
See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834 (suggesting that viewpoint discrimination is permissible when the
government is the speaker but not when the government is encouraging private speakers to express a variety of viewpoints).
See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., NEA v. Finley: A Decision in Search of a Rationale, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,
2 (1999) (“Much of the confusion in the [Finley] opinion seems quite deliberate, as if to suggest
that the Court decided to reach a result it found difficult to justify under existing precedent, thus
producing an opinion that through obscurity might cause as little damage as possible to the existing doctrinal framework.”).
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572–73 (1998) (ruling that National Endowment for the Arts grant criteria are facially valid as not interfering with First Amendment
rights).
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B. The Court Changes Course
At issue in Finley was a congressional mandate requiring the Chairperson of the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) to “tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs
and values of the American public”99 before granting artists public funding.
Members of Congress believed the additional requirement necessary after
they became aware that NEA funds had been used to mount an exhibition
of Robert Mapplethorpe’s homoerotic work100 and had been used to support the work of Andres Serrano, who had created “Piss Christ,” which
some believed sacrilegious.101
The Court considered whether the decency and respect “provision is a
paradigmatic example of viewpoint discrimination because it rejects any artistic speech that either fails to respect mainstream values or offends standards of decency.”102 But the Court took issue with the claim that such works
must be rejected, instead noting that the National Endowment for the Arts
“reads the provision as merely hortatory, and contends that it stops well
short of an absolute restriction.”103 The contested section did “not preclude
awards to projects that might be deemed ‘indecent’ or ‘disrespectful,’ nor
place conditions on grants, or even specify that those factors must be given
any particular weight in reviewing an application.”104 Because Congress
had merely required that such works be disfavored rather than that they not
receive funding under any circumstances,105 the Court suggested that this
was not the kind of restriction that violated constitutional guarantees.106
Allegedly, “the ‘decency and respect’ criteria do not silence speakers by
expressly ‘threaten[ing] censorship of ideas.’”107 The Court reasoned that
“the varied interpretations of the criteria and the vague exhortation to ‘take

99
100

101

102
103
104
105

106

107

Id. at 572 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994)).
Id. at 574 (citing 135 Cong. Rec. 22372 (1989)) (“The Institute of Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania had used $30,000 of a visual arts grant it received from the NEA to fund a
1989 retrospective of photographer Robert Mapplethorpe’s work . . . [which] included homoerotic photographs that several Members of Congress condemned as pornographic.”).
Id. (citing 135 Cong. Rec. 9789 (1989) (“Members also denounced artist Andres Serrano’s work
Piss Christ, a photograph of a crucifix immersed in urine. Serrano had been awarded a $15,000
grant from the Southeast Center for Contemporary Art, an organization that received NEA support.”).
Id. at 580.
Id.
Id. at 580–81.
Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Instead of banning the funding of such productions absolutely, which I think would have been entirely constitutional, Congress took the
lesser step of requiring them to be disfavored in the evaluation of grant applications.”).
Id. at 590 (majority opinion) (“Section 954(d)(1) merely adds some imprecise considerations to an
already subjective selection process. It does not, on its face, impermissibly infringe on First or
Fifth Amendment rights.”).
Id. at 583 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992)).

May 2017]

RUST IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT SCAFFOLDING

875

them into consideration’”108 made it “unlikely that this provision will introduce any greater element of selectivity than the determination of ‘artistic
excellence’ itself.”109 Thus, the Court seemed to say, because mainstream
values and decency might be interpreted in many different ways, these additional considerations would be unlikely to have the chilling effect that was
feared. Yet, it was not as if artists seeking funding would have no idea
which viewpoints were disfavored. As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in the judgment, the limitation at issue was adopted in response to the
funding of the work of Mapplethorpe and Serrano,110 which meant that artists would be on notice with respect to some kinds of work that would be
disfavored.111 Justice Scalia readily admitted that this was viewpoint discrimination,112 although he believed such discrimination constitutionally
permissible.113 As a further reason not to strike down the provision, the
Court explained that “[a]ny content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nature of arts funding.”114 Precisely because the NEA has limited funds, that
agency must of necessity “deny the majority of the grant applications that it
receives, including many that propose ‘artistically excellent’ projects.”115
Thus, it was not as if an individual artist would have a reasonable expectation that he or she would receive funding, given that the number of individuals seeking funding greatly exceeded the available funds.116
While the Court was correct that the demand for funding exceeded the
supply of grant dollars, that was beside the point. The whole issue was whether aesthetically excellent entries could be denied funding based on the artist’s

108
109

110
111
112
113

114
115
116

Id. at 583–84.
Id. at 584; see also Harold B. Walther, Note, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: Sinking
Deeper into the Abyss of the Supreme Court’s Unintelligible Modern Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 59
MD. L. REV. 225, 239 (2000) (“The Court . . . further justif[ied] their finding that a clear penalty
did not exist in § 954(d)(1) by stating that because people would generally not agree as to what
constitutes ‘decency’ and ‘respect,’ ‘the provision does not introduce considerations
that . . . would effectively preclude or punish the expression of particular views.’” (quoting Finley,
524 U.S. at 583)).
Finley, 524 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Cf. id. at 589 (majority opinion) (“We recognize, as a practical matter, that artists may conform
their speech to what they believe to be the decisionmaking criteria in order to acquire funding.”).
Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“This unquestionably constitutes viewpoint
discrimination.”).
See id. at 598 (“[T]he congressional determination to favor decency and respect for beliefs and
values over the opposite [is constitutional] because such favoritism does not ‘abridge’ anyone’s
freedom of speech.”).
Id. at 585 (majority opinion).
Id.
See Ingber, supra note 42, at 1613–14 (“The amount of money allotted by the government to be
dispensed by the NEA will always be limited and exceeded by the number of applicants. Scarcity
requires a competition among applicants for grants, as a grant given to one artist is necessarily
denied to another.” (footnote omitted)).
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expressed viewpoint.117 Merely because some criteria were used to exclude
would hardly mean that viewpoint was also an appropriate consideration.
Consider college admissions. Elite schools may have many more deserving applicants than they can admit.118 Yet, merely because college admissions are very competitive would not somehow establish that an individual could be denied admission because of an irrelevant consideration such
as her minority racial status. Such a policy would be unconstitutional, precisely because the use of one of the factors, even if not dispositive, was
nonetheless irrational and a violation of constitutional guarantees.119
Ironically, after suggesting that the competitive nature of the grant funding made it permissible for viewpoint to be considered in the process, the
Finley Court explained that “[i]f the NEA were to leverage its power to
award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different case.”120 However, the
Court did not specify what kinds of problems would be posed if the NEA
were penalizing disfavored viewpoints. The Court might merely have been
suggesting that such an interpretation would have misconstrued congressional intent,121 or the Court might have been suggesting that penalizing disfavored viewpoints would have violated First Amendment guarantees.122
The Court reaffirmed that “Congress has wide latitude to set spending
priorities,”123 and cited Rust for the proposition that “Congress may ‘selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program
117

118

119

120
121
122

123

See Kristine M. Cunnane, Note, Maintaining Viewpoint Neutrality for the NEA: National Endowment
for the Arts v. Finley, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1472 (1999) (“Although the NEA is a selective
funding program, selectivity does not justify viewpoint discrimination in supporting private
speech.”).
See Michael A. Olivas, Higher Education Admissions and the Search for One Important Thing, 21 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 993, 994 (1999) (“Elite undergraduate institutions, highly regarded graduate programs, and competitive professional schools are more alike than they are different: selecting among many qualified applicants requires similar procedures that cut across types of
schools.”).
See Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (“[A] plaintiff who challenges an ongoing raceconscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not affirmatively establish that he would
receive the benefit in question if race were not considered. The relevant injury in such cases is
‘the inability to compete on an equal footing.’” (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)).
Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.
See id. at 600 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Congress took the lesser step of requiring
them to be disfavored in the evaluation of grant applications.”).
See id. at 587 (majority opinion) (“[T]he First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy
context . . . .”); id. (“[E]ven in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not ‘ai[m] at the
suppression of dangerous ideas.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)). But see id. at 600 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“[B]anning the funding of such productions absolutely . . . would have been entirely
constitutional . . . .”).
Id. at 588 (majority opinion) (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 549).

May 2017]

RUST IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT SCAFFOLDING

877

which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.’”124 But Rosenberger
had suggested that Rust only authorized selective funding where government was itself the speaker,125 and there was no suggestion that the NEA
was only funding the government’s message. Indeed, Justice Souter noted
in his dissent that “this patronage falls embarrassingly on the wrong side of
the line between government-as-buyer or -speaker and government-asregulator-of-private-speech.”126
The government-as-speaker explanation of Rust permitting the government to articulate its own views without articulating competing views127
does not permit the government to penalize the expression of disapproved
viewpoints when the government is not speaking.128 On that understanding
of Rust, Finley should have been decided differently, as Justice Souter observed.129 While the government-as-spender explanation of Rust supported
the Finley holding,130 it undermined the result in Rosenberger.131 Basically,
Rust is being used in incompatible ways.
C. Another About-Face
Rust was controversial at least in part because it construed a federally
funded program providing medical services as the government’s expressing
its own views through private individuals. The Rust approach was the focus
of an analysis in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.132

124

125

126
127

128
129
130

131

132

Id. (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)); see also Bloom, supra note 97, at 15
(“[T]he majority explained that the Government has wide discretion to choose spending priorities or to engage in selective funding without discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.”).
See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (asserting that the Rosenberger Court read Rust as
permitting government restriction on the funding of messages only when the government itself
was the speaker).
Finley, 524 U.S. at 612 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (“When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to
encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles . . . it was not constitutionally required
to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and
fascism.” (citing 22 U.S.C. § 4411(b) (1988)); see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (“[I]t seems inevitable that funds raised by the government
will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies.” (citing
Rust, 500 U.S. at 193)).
See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (explaining that the government’s ability to restrict
funding on messages does not apply to private speakers).
See supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting Justice Souter’s Finley dissent, which drew a line
between government-as-speaker or -buyer and government-as-regulator-of-private-speech).
Cf. Finley, 524 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)) (“It is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer subsidy
with measures “‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”).
See supra note 59 and accompanying text (suggesting that if the Rust Court had held that the government as a funder was able to discriminate based on viewpoint, Rosenberger would have been
decided differently).
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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At issue in Velazquez was the constitutionality of restrictions imposed on the
Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”).133 The Legal Services Corporation provided funds to local organizations to provide legal representation to indigents
on non-criminal matters.134 However, Congress had specified that funding
could not be provided to assert that “a state statute conflicts with a federal
statute or that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its application
is violative of the United States Constitution.”135 That did not mean that
LSC-funded attorneys were barred from helping their indigent clients, because “an LSC grantee could represent a welfare claimant who argued that an
agency made an erroneous factual determination or that an agency misread
or misapplied a term contained in an existing welfare statute.”136
The program at issue in Velasquez was analogous in some ways to the
program at issue in Rust. In each, Congress had expressly limited what it
was willing to fund137—Congress refused to promote abortion in Rust138 and
refused to promote challenges to the legality or constitutionality of particular laws in Velasquez.139
When analyzing the constitutionality of the LSC prohibition, the Court
first offered its Rosenberger interpretation of Rust.140 The Rust and Velasquez
programs were distinguishable because “the LSC program was designed to
facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message.”141 Although the government needs to constrain the use of funds142 when “establish[ing] a subsidy for specified ends,”143 the Velasquez Court worried that up-

133
134

135
136
137
138
139
140

141
142
143

Id. at 536 (“This suit requires us to decide whether one of the conditions imposed by Congress on
the use of LSC funds violates the First Amendment rights of LSC grantees and their clients.”).
Id. (“LSC’s mission is to distribute funds appropriated by Congress to eligible local grantee organizations ‘for the purpose of providing financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2996b(a) (2000)).
Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
See id., 531 U.S. at 553 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that like the scheme in Rust, the LSC Act
placed restrictions on the use of funds).
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that funds could not be used to support abortion
as a method of family planning).
See supra note 135 and accompanying text (describing challenges to laws for which LSC funds
could not be used).
See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (“As we said in Rosenberger, ‘[w]hen the government disburses public
funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995));
Gabriel J. Chin & Saira Rao, Pledging Allegiance to the Constitution: The First Amendment and Loyalty
Oaths for Faculty at Private Universities, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 431, 457 (2003) (“The Rosenberger formulation was followed in Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez . . . .”).
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
See id. at 543 (“[C]ertain restrictions may be necessary to define the limits and purposes of the
program.” (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 53 (1983)).
Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991)).
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holding the limitation would “insulate the Government’s interpretation of the
Constitution from judicial challenge.”144 Yet, as Justice Scalia noted in his
dissent, “No litigant who, in the absence of LSC funding would bring a suit
challenging existing welfare law is deterred from doing so by § 504(a)(16).”145
The difficulty posed in Velasquez was not in its refusal to hold that the attorneys were speaking for the government but in its apparent acceptance of
the proposition that the doctors in Rust were speaking for the government.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, “If the private doctors’ confidential
advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted ‘government speech,’ it is
hard to imagine what subsidized speech would not be government
speech.”146 Further, if attorneys’ professional responsibilities might be
compromised by agreeing to the imposed limitations at issue in Velasquez,
the same would have been true of the physicians agreeing to the imposed
limitations at issue in Rust.147 Finally, the insulation of the government’s
position from challenge would not be any greater as a result of the limitation on LSC funding than would have occurred had Congress provided no
funding for these kinds of cases,148 which mirrored the response offered by
the Court to the challenge in Rust on the limitations on Title X funding.149
Rust and Velasquez became even more difficult to understand when the
Court issued United States v. American Library Association (ALA).150 At issue was a
congressional limitation imposed on federal funding of public libraries. Under the Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”),151 “a public library may
not receive federal assistance to provide Internet access unless it installs software to block images that constitute obscenity or child pornography, and to
prevent minors from obtaining access to material that is harmful to them.”152
By providing access to the internet, libraries offer their patrons a wealth
of information.153 But they also thereby provide ready access to a great
deal of pornography, and many patrons, including minors, do online

144
145
146
147

148

149

150
151
152
153

Id. at 548.
Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. (“[T]he majority’s contention that the subsidized speech in these cases is not government
speech because the lawyers have a professional obligation to represent the interests of their clients
founders on the reality that the doctors in Rust had a professional obligation to serve the interests
of their patients . . . .”).
Cf. id. at 556 (“It may well be that the bar of § 504(a)(16) will cause LSC-funded attorneys to decline or to withdraw from cases that involve statutory validity . . . . The same result would ensue
from excluding LSC-funded lawyers from welfare litigation entirely.”).
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 202 (1991) (stating that the difficulty a woman faces when a
Title X project fails to provide abortion counseling or referral leaves her no worse off than she
would have been had the government not enacted Title X).
539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion) .
20 U.S.C. §§ 9134 (2000).
ALA, 539 U.S. at 199.
Id. at 200.
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searches for sexually explicit material.154 Filtering devices can prevent patrons from accessing these pornographic sites,155 although these filters not
only block pornography but other material that is neither obscene nor pornographic.156 The challenge to the restriction was that Congress had conditioned receipt of the funds on the libraries using filters that restricted constitutionally protected speech.157
The Court began its analysis by discussing whether the libraries themselves would violate constitutional guarantees by choosing to employ the filtering software.158 Certainly, if libraries were constitutionally prohibited from
limiting access to constitutionally protected information then Congress’s attempting to induce libraries to do so would be constitutionally problematic.159
It did not take long for the Court to reject the claim that libraries are
constitutionally required to provide “universal coverage.”160 Libraries are
subject to financial constraints,161 so libraries must of course “consider content in making collection decisions.”162 They would neither be able to purchase all the materials that they might like nor could they house all of those
materials anyway.
One need not worry about space considerations in the same way when the
issue involves the internet,163 since the relevant space considerations involve
the terminals themselves rather than all of the data that might be accessed using the terminals.164 That said, however, space considerations are not the only
154
155
156
157

158

159
160
161

162
163

164

Id. (citing Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 419 (E.D. Pa. 2002), overruled
by ALA, 539 U.S. 194 (plurality opinion)).
Id. (“[F]iltering software that blocks access to pornographic Web sites could provide a reasonably
effective way to prevent such uses of library resources.”).
Id. at 201 (“But a filter set to block pornography may sometimes block other sites that present
neither obscene nor pornographic material, but that nevertheless trigger the filter.”).
Id. at 210 (“Appellees argue that CIPA imposes an unconstitutional condition on libraries . . . by
requiring them, as a condition on their receipt of federal funds, to surrender their First Amendment right to provide the public with access to constitutionally protected speech.”).
Id. at 203 (“To determine whether libraries would violate the First Amendment by employing the
filtering software that CIPA requires, we must first examine the role of libraries in our society.”
(footnote omitted)).
Id. (“Congress may not ‘induce’ the recipient ‘to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional.’” (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987)).
Id. at 204 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
overruled by ALA, 539 U.S. 194 (plurality opinion)).
Mark S. Nadel, The First Amendment’s Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and School Libraries: What Content Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1127 (2000) (“[L]ibraries, due
to their limited budgets, compile their collections based on the roles they choose for serving the
needs, interests, and priorities of their community.”).
ALA, 539 U.S. at 205.
Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right to Read,
and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799,
849 (2006) (“[V]irtual offerings are not subject to limits on shelf space or resources.”).
That said, there may be limits on the number of terminals that can be provided, which might
mean that libraries could not afford to offer patrons unlimited access. See Mitchell P. Goldstein,
Congress and the Courts Battle over the First Amendment: Can the Law Really Protect Children from Pornography
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concern when libraries limit their collection, because libraries might want to
impose some quality control on the materials that can be accessed.165
The ALA plurality suggested that the library’s collection was “to facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of
requisite and appropriate quality.”166 But if users are prevented from seeing non-obscene, non-pornographic material, they might be limited in their
efforts to learn, do research, or pursue recreational pursuits. Nonetheless,
libraries must make choices in light of existing limitations and the current
technology might not be sufficiently sophisticated to block out only the targeted materials.167 Further, because libraries do not have the resources to
decide which sites on the internet in particular should be blocked and
which should not,168 it seems reasonable for libraries to adopt restrictions
that may not be perfectly tailored to keeping out only those contents that
the library wishes to exclude.169 For these reasons, the plurality held that
libraries do not violate constitutional guarantees when using filters that restrict some constitutionally protected materials.170
Yet, the challenge at issue did not involve a policy the libraries had
freely adopted but the congressionally imposed condition on the receipt of
funds. The appellees had argued that that the congressional limitation was
unconstitutional because it required the libraries, “as a condition on their

165

166
167

168
169

170

on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141, 186 n.288 (2003) (citing Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 465 n.25 (E.D. Pa. 2002), overruled by ALA, 539
U.S. 194 (plurality opinion)) (discussing the district court’s observation that, like “the scarcity of a
library’s budget and shelf space,” “the scarcity of time at Internet terminals constrains the libraries’ ability to provide patrons with unrestricted Internet access”).
See ALA, 539 U.S. at 204 (“[L]ibraries collect only those materials deemed to have ‘requisite and
appropriate quality.’” (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 421
(E.D. Pa. 2002), overruled by ALA, 539 U.S. 194 (plurality opinion)); see also Goldstein, supra note
164 (suggesting that unlimited access might be counterproductive for the users).
ALA, 539 U.S. at 206.
See id. at 215 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing how the employed technology
both blocks material that should not be blocked and fails to block material that should be
blocked).
Id. at 208 (plurality opinion) (“[L]ibraries cannot possibly segregate, item by item, all the Internet
material that is appropriate for inclusion from all that is not.”).
Id. (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for public libraries to . . . exclude certain categories of content,
without making individualized judgments that everything they do make available has requisite
and appropriate quality.”); see also Thomas B. Nachbar, Speech and Institutional Choice, 21 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 67, 76 (2006) (“The Court held that the burden imposed by the statute on library
patrons was substantially reduced by the fact that libraries have traditionally exercised substantial
discretion in deciding what materials to make available to the public. Given this, it was permissible for Congress to piggyback the CIPA filters on the libraries’ institutional role as mediators of
information to further the (ostensibly permissible) statutory objective of limiting children’s access
to indecent content.”)
ALA, 539 U.S. at 208 (“A library’s need to exercise judgment in making collection decisions depends on its traditional role in identifying suitable and worthwhile material; it is no less entitled to
play that role when it collects material from the Internet than when it collects material from any
other source.”).
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receipt of federal funds, to surrender their First Amendment right to provide the public with access to constitutionally protected speech.”171 The
government had countered that “Government entities do not have First
Amendment rights.”172
Rather than address whether public entities have First Amendment
rights, the plurality instead addressed whether Congress had violated constitutional guarantees by conditioning the receipt of funds on the libraries
filtering protected as well as unprotected speech. Citing Rust, the plurality
explained: “Within broad limits, ‘when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.’”173 This understanding of Rust was compatible with Finley,174 but
undermined the holdings in Rosenberger175 and Velasquez.176
The plurality specifically addressed why Velasquez was not controlling,
noting that “the role of lawyers who represent clients in welfare disputes is
to advocate against the Government, and there was thus an assumption that
counsel would be free of state control.”177 In contrast, libraries “have no
comparable role that pits them against the Government, and there is no
comparable assumption that they must be free of any conditions that their
benefactors might attach to the use of donated funds or other assistance.”178
Yet, the plurality’s analysis was misleading in a few different respects.
First, in Velasquez, the LSC funding was appropriately used against the government in that LSC attorneys were permitted to represent an individual
who (allegedly) had wrongly been denied benefits.179 Perhaps the government had made a factual error or an agency had misinterpreted one of the
relevant criteria for benefits.180 The LSC attorneys were only restricted

171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

179

180

Id. at 210.
Id.
Id. at 211 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
For a discussion of Finley, see supra notes 99–130 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Rosenberger, see supra notes 50–96 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Velasquez, see supra notes 132–149 and accompanying text.
ALA, 539 U.S. at 213.
Id.; see also Lillian R. BeVier, United States v. American Library Association: Whither First Amendment Doctrine, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 172 (“[T]he plurality distinguished Legal Services Corp. v Velasquez on the ground that, unlike legal advocates for the poor, public libraries do not occupy a
role that ‘pits them against the Government.’” (quoting ALA, 539 U.S. at 213)). But see Leading
Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 355 (2003) (“[A] library’s interest may conflict with attempts by
the federal government to control libraries’ collection decisions . . . .”).
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 538 (2001) (“LSC interpreted the statutory
provision to allow indigent clients to challenge welfare agency determinations of benefit ineligibility under interpretations of existing law.”).
Id. (“[A]n LSC grantee could represent a welfare claimant who argued that an agency made an
erroneous factual determination or that an agency misread or misapplied a term contained in an
existing welfare statute.”).

May 2017]

RUST IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT SCAFFOLDING

883

from arguing against the government on certain matters, e.g., the unconstitutionality of welfare laws.181
Libraries might have a comparable role pitting them against the government insofar as they are to provide patrons with a wealth of materials.
Consider the observation by the Rust Court that Congress could promote
democracy without promoting communism or fascism.182 Suppose that
Congress conditioned receipt of federal funds on the library not acquiring
books on a competing form of government, say, communism. Because libraries enjoy great discretion in making their choices about what to
stock,183 let us assume that it would be permissible for a library to choose to
stock books on other subjects rather than on communism. But even if a library could choose to refrain from buying books about other political systems, that would hardly establish that it should do so. A library might well
be pitted against the government if the government wanted to limit patron
access to political information. Further, it might be noted that the ALA rationale would permit the government to condition the receipt of federal
funding on a library choosing not to acquire certain political tracts, since
the library itself could presumably decide to forego acquiring such tracts
and the government is given great discretion with respect to which political
messages it wishes to send or support.
In Rust, the Court explained that women were no worse off as a result of
the Title X funding than they would have been had there been no federal
funding of family planning.184 However, in ALA, even computers bought
with state funds had to be equipped with the filter,185 so that constitutionally
protected information that might otherwise have been accessible (because
unfiltered) would now be inaccessible. This means that some patrons
would be in a worse position as a result of the funding because denied access to materials that they might otherwise have seen.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that the plurality was engaging in
a bit of sleight of hand. While admitting that libraries have discretion to
make decisions about what is in their collection,186 he argued that the issue
181

182

183
184
185

186

Id. at 538–39 (“Under LSC’s interpretation, however, grantees could not accept representations
designed to change welfare laws, much less argue against the constitutionality or statutory validity
of those laws.”).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“When Congress established a National Endowment
for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as
communism and fascism.” (citing 22 U.S.C. § 4411(b) (1988)).
ALA, 539 U.S. at 205.
Rust, 500 U.S. at 202.
Barbara A. Sanchez, Note, United States v. American Library Association: The Choice Between
Cash and Constitutional Rights, 38 AKRON L. REV. 463, 492 (2005) (“CIPA conditions funding on
installing filters on every single computer, even those wholly funded with state and local dollars.”
(footnote omitted)).
ALA, 539 U.S. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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was more complicated than that. Congress would presumably be constitutionally precluded from penalizing libraries for failing to install the filtering
software,187 and an “abridgment of speech by means of a threatened denial of
benefits can be just as pernicious as an abridgment by means of a threatened
penalty.”188 Justice Stevens was the only member of the Court to note that
the plurality’s description of Rust did not comport with the treatment of that
decision in other cases: “[A]s subsequent cases have explained, Rust only involved, and only applies to, instances of governmental speech—that is, situations in which the government seeks to communicate a specific message.”189
Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.
(AID)190 only made the analysis harder to understand. At issue was the constitutionality of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (“Leadership Act”).191 The Act appropriated billions of dollars to be distributed to non-governmental organizations
to help fight the spread of HIV/AIDS.192 However, two conditions were
imposed on that funding: (1) “no funds made available by the Act ‘may be
used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or
sex trafficking,’”193 and (2) “no funds may be used by an organization ‘that
does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.’”194 At issue was whether the second provision violates the First
Amendment rights of would-be recipients.195
The Court began its analysis by noting that Congress has broad discretion in deciding how to spend monies to promote the general welfare.196
Further, the Court cited Rust for the proposition that Congress can “impose
limits on the use of . . . funds to ensure they are used in the manner Congress intends.”197 After all, a party objecting to a condition need not accept
the funding, and this is true even when it is alleged that the condition affects
“the recipient’s exercise of its First Amendment rights.”198
Yet, the Court reasoned that Congress was limited with respect to the
conditions that could be placed on the receipt of federal funding. While
187
188
189

190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id. (citing Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
Id. at 227.
Id. at 228; cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 437 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“We have
read Rust to mean that ‘when the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular
policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.’” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
22 U.S.C. §§ 7601–7682 (2012).
AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2324.
Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (2012)).
Id. at 2324–25 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2012)).
Id. at 2325.
Id. at 2327–28.
Id. at 2328 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991)).
Id. (citing United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003) (plurality opinion)).
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admitting that “[t]he line is hardly clear,” the Court argued that “the relevant distinction that has emerged from our cases is between conditions that
define the limits of the government spending program—those that specify
the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”199
To illustrate the distinction, the Court discussed Rust among other cases.200
Rust established that “Congress can, without offending the Constitution,
selectively fund certain programs to address an issue of public concern,
without funding alternative ways of addressing the same problem.”201 But
Rust recognized that there were limits on the restrictions that Congress
could impose. The AID Court noted that Rust had distinguished between
limitations on the grantee and limitations on the project,202 and that the
funding limitation only governed the project and did not govern other activities in which the grantee might be engaged.203 The AID Court concluded that because the Title X “regulations did not ‘prohibit[ ] the recipient
from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally
funded program,’ they did not run afoul of the First Amendment.”204
While it is true that the Rust Court noted that grantees and their employees were permitted to discuss abortion outside of the Title X project,205 it
may be helpful to consider how to determine what was within the confines
of the project and what was not. The Rust Court made clear that merely
keeping Title X funds separate through careful bookkeeping would not suffice.206 Instead, several factors would be considered in “a case-by-case determination of objective integrity and independence, such as the existence of
separate accounting records and separate personnel, and the degree of physical separation of the project from facilities for prohibited activities.”207
The approach at issue in AID was analogous to the approach in Rust in
several respects. Funded organizations could work with independent organizations that did not espouse the official anti-prostitution position208 as
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

206
207

208

Id.
See id. at 2321, 2328–30.
Id. at 2329–30 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193, 196 (1991)).
Id. at 2330 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196).
Id. (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 197).
Rust, 500 U.S. at 183 (“Title X grantees and their employees ‘remain free to say whatever they
wish about abortion outside the Title X project.’” (quoting New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401,
412 (2d Cir. 1989), aff’d sub nom. Rust 500 U.S. 173).
Id. at 180.
Id. at 180–81; see also AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2329 (“To enforce this provision, HHS regulations
barred Title X projects from advocating abortion as a method of family planning, and required
grantees to ensure that their Title X projects were ‘physically and financially separate’ from their
other projects that engaged in the prohibited activities.” (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 180–81)).
See AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2326 (“The guidelines permit funding recipients to work with affiliated organizations that ‘engage [ ] in activities inconsistent with the recipient’s opposition to the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking’ as long as the recipients retain ‘objective integrity and inde-
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long as those latter organizations were sufficiently independent from the
grantee in light of certain objective criteria,209 just as Title X facilities could
refer to independent facilities that provided abortions among other services.210 The AID Court noted that a “recipient cannot avow the belief dictated by the Policy Requirement when spending Leadership Act funds, and
then turn around and assert a contrary belief, or claim neutrality, when
participating in activities on its own time and dime.”211 But performing the
prohibited activity on one’s own dime and time (without doing additional
things to establish separation) would have involved mere bookkeeping that
would not have won the day in Rust either.212 Indeed, the claim that Congress was acting unconstitutionally because limiting how non-Title-X funds
would be used (e.g., where a facility received both Title X funding and other funding too) was expressly considered and rejected in Rust.213 In Rust,
any activity favoring abortion rights would not only have to have been on
the organization’s own dime and time,214 but also performed by different
personnel and in a different physical location.215
The point here should not be misunderstood. The AID Court’s limitation on the degree to which Congress can impose restrictions on funding
recipients may be compatible with certain cases.216 Further, that approach
may well have been very sensible as a matter of public policy, because there
was testimony that requiring the agencies to espouse an anti-prostitution
message would have impeded their ability to do their work.217 But the AID

209

210
211
212
213
214
215
216

217

pendence from any affiliated organization.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 89.3
(2011); see also Nicholas Bruno, Note, Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open
Society International: An Alternative Approach to Aid in Analyzing Free Speech Concerns Raised by Government Funding Requirements, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1569, 1575 (2015) (“If the NGO had ‘objective integrity and independence’ from such an affiliate organization, the NGO could still receive funding
from the HIV/AIDS program even if the affiliate organization did not explicitly oppose prostitution.” (quoting § 89.3)).
AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2326–27 (“Whether sufficient separation exists is determined by the totality of
the circumstances, including ‘but not . . . limited to’ (1) whether the organizations are legally separate; (2) whether they have separate personnel; (3) whether they keep separate accounting records; (4) the degree of separation in the organizations’ facilities; and (5) the extent to which signs
and other forms of identification distinguish the organizations.” (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 89.3(b)(1)–
(5) (2011))).
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2330.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187–88 (1991).
See AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2330.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
See AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2328–29 (claiming that the account explains Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) and FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)). But see id. at 2334 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“None of the cases the
Court cites for its holding provide support.”).
Id. at 2326 (majority opinion) (“Respondents fear that adopting a policy explicitly opposing prostitution may alienate certain host governments, and may diminish the effectiveness of some of
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Court’s account of Rust was not plausible. Further, the previous jurisprudence which (sometimes) suggested that the government had great discretion when hiring individuals to communicate its own message would seem
to support the government’s having had discretion to prefer certain groups
rather than others to carry out its program.218 A separate question is
whether the government was impeding its own efforts by requiring organizations to articulate an anti-prostitution message, but that consideration
seemed to speak to the wisdom of the policy rather than to whether Congress in light of the past jurisprudence had the power to condition the receipts of funds in this way.219
CONCLUSION
Rust has been cited both for the proposition that the state has great discretion when attaching conditions to the receipt of state funding and that
the state only has great discretion when funding its own message. Neither
position is absurd on its face and each might be adopted if in line with the
past case law. The difficulty posed by Rust has been that the Court has oscillated between these holdings when deciding cases even when the alternative holding would have required a different result.
One expects jurisprudence to evolve, so the fact that a case no longer
stands for what it once did need not be a basis for criticism. What is so unusual about Rust is that the Court seesaws between incompatible accounts
of the case with no explanation of why one account rather than another is
offered. The Court thereby promotes the perception that its holdings are
result-oriented and unprincipled, and offers no guidance to those who wish
to act in accord with the law. This cavalier treatment of Rust is likely to
have spillover effects, undermining the Court’s credibility in First Amendment matters more generally. The Court must stop treating cases as lumps
of clay, ready to be pressed into whatever shape is desired for the creation
of the day. First Amendment jurisprudence and the Court’s own integrity
hang in the balance.

218

219

their programs by making it more difficult to work with prostitutes in the fight against
HIV/AIDS.”).
See id. at 2332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Policy Requirement is nothing more than a means of
selecting suitable agents to implement the Government’s chosen strategy to eradicate
HIV/AIDS.”).
Cf. id. at 2333 (“The program is valid only if the Government is entitled to disfavor the opposing
view (here, advocacy of or toleration of prostitution). And if the program can disfavor it, so can
the selection of those who are to administer the program.”).
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